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Abstract
Replicability and reproducibility of computational models has been somewhat understudied by Bthe replication
movement.^ In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments
and on the mechanistic account of explanation to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproduc-
tions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain
the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to
recreate a model without original code, serve different functions and fail for different reasons. This means that
measures designed to improve model replicability may not enhance (and, in some cases, may actually damage)
model reproducibility. We claim that although both are undesirable, low model reproducibility poses more of a
threat to long-term scientific progress than low model replicability. In our opinion, low model reproducibility stems
mostly from authors' omitting to provide crucial information in scientific papers and we stress that sharing all
computer code and data is not a solution. Reports of computational studies should remain selective and include
all and only relevant bits of code.
Keywords Replication studies . Computational modeling . Methodology of computational neuroscience . Direct and conceptual
replication . Replication and reproduction
1 Background
Public controllability of research and reliability of results are
the cornerstones of science, so it is no surprise that recent
doubts about researchers’ ability to consistently duplicate
findings in a number of scientific fields have caused quite a
stir in the scientific community (Button et al. 2013; Loken and
Gelman 2017; Maxwell et al. 2015). The crisis of confidence
provoked by critical assessments of reproducibility has
affected such disciplines as psychology, neuroscience, eco-
nomics and medicine. In this paper, we draw on methodolog-
ical insights from psychology to assess the problems of repli-
cability and reproducibility of computational models in
neuroscience.
The paper unfolds in the following manner. In the subse-
quent section, we introduce the notions of repeatability and
reproducibility as they are used in physics, chemistry and
medicine, and discuss the various types and functions of rep-
lication studies in psychology, where the recent crisis has in-
spired serious methodological reflection on the subject. The
point of this exercise is to get a solid understanding of why
exactly replicability of experimental research is so important
and to what extent the functions of replication may depend on
factors specific to a given field of study. We describe a basic
methodological distinction between direct and conceptual rep-
lications. A direct replication aims to recreate an original ex-
periment, whereas a conceptual replication modifies a previ-
ously used experimental procedure. Although they serve dif-
ferent functions, both kinds of replication are necessary for
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long-term scientific progress. We also observe that psycholo-
gists participating in the replicability debate focus on empiri-
cal experiments and completely ignore computational model-
ing—an oversight that may lead the scientific community to
underestimate the full extent of the confidence crisis. In sec-
tion 3, we define the terms Brepeatability,^ Breplicability^ and
Breproducibility^ as they are used in computational modeling
and describe problems with the replicability and
reproducibility of computational models, which we illustrate
with a study by Manninen et al. (2017) who attempted to
recreate models of astrocyte excitation. We review several
proposals of how to improve model replicability and repro-
ducibility and observe that it is difficult to assess them because
they have not been adequately justified. Section 4 focuses on
the specific functions of replications and reproductions in
computational modeling. We note that the distinction between
replications and reproductions drawn in the modeling litera-
ture corresponds nicely with that between direct and concep-
tual replications in psychology but, due to differences between
modeling and empirical studies, we claim that low model rep-
licability, though undesirable, does not pose a serious threat to
long-term scientific progress. What is essential to scientific
progress is model reproducibility, or the ability of other re-
searchers to recreate a model based on its published descrip-
tion. It is important in our opinion to keep these two notions
distinct because some measures designed to improve model
replicability may actually inhibit model reproducibility. We
claim that low model reproducibility stems mostly from au-
thors’ omitting to provide crucial information in scientific pa-
pers and we stress that sharing all computer code and data is
not a sufficient solution. Papers should remain selective and
include all and only relevant bits of code. By relying on a
recent discussion on the normative principle of completeness,
proposed by philosophers of science, we defend a version of
the principle for computational modeling in general. We close
by drawing attention to the limitations of standardization as a
means of improving model replicability.
2 Repeatability, reproducibility
and replicability of empirical studies
It is clear that the ability to recreate a scientific result is closely
associated with some of the most general aspects of scientific
inquiry. One way to think about it is in terms of the tension
between the ideal of objectivity, on the one hand, and our
various cognitive limitations, on the other. It would be unrea-
sonable, for example, to announce a new discovery on the
strength of a single observation because we know that no
observational technique is perfectly precise. In many sciences,
such as physics, chemistry and medicine, measurements of a
property are often repeated by the same researcher (group of
researchers), using the same equipment and a specimen from
the same source. If the values of successive measurements are
close to one another, the measurements are said to be highly
repeatable (Lyons 1986, pp. 3–7, Miller and Miller 2010, pp.
5–6, Connett 2008, Plesser 2018). Repeat experiments allow
researchers to estimate random error inherent in any observa-
tion. Although important, repeat observations are not the fo-
cus of our paper. We are more interested in what researchers in
chemistry and medicine call reproductions, i.e., experiments
duplicated by an independent researcher or group of re-
searchers, often by means of a different instrument used on a
specimen drawn from a different source. The extent to which
the elements of a reproduction can diverge from the original
experiment vary with the field of study. It is crucial, however,
that the reproduction experiment be conducted by someone
other than the original investigator. The advantages of repro-
ducible research are considerable. Besides allowing the scien-
tific community to detect researcher fraud and address a num-
ber of biases (reproductions often serve to reduce systematic
error), the idea that acceptability of scientific claims is associ-
ated with reproducibility informs the standards of scientific
writing and contributes to making scientific investigation a
genuinely collective and cumulative endeavor.
Despite a seemingly widespread awareness of the impor-
tance of replicability—to use an umbrella term popular in the
social sciences—serious methodological reflection on the
roles of replication in psychology was surprisingly slow in
coming. The situation has changed only recently. According
to Schmidt (2009), replication studies in psychology serve a
wide range of functions, such as aiming to discover false pos-
itives, controlling for artifacts, addressing researcher fraud,
attempting to generalize a result to a different population and
trying to confirm a previously supported hypothesis using a
different experimental procedure. As no single study can ful-
fill all these functions, some distinctions must be made to
avoid confusion.
One distinction that has become influential is the contrast
between direct and conceptual replications (Hüffmeier et al.
2016; Schmidt 2009; Stroebe and Strack 2014; Zwaan et al.
2018). Although each writer offers a slightly different defini-
tion, the distinction can be drawn as follows. Direct
replications are intended to recreate an original study (its sam-
ples, measures, procedures, etc.) according to the current un-
derstanding of what is needed to produce the phenomenon
under investigation. Conceptual replications, by contrast, de-
liberately modify the critical elements of an original procedure
in order to test the robustness of a phenomenon or the gener-
ality of a theoretical claim. In other words, the main purpose of
a conceptual replication is to investigate the target theory or
hypothesis in a novel way (Zwaan et al. 2018).
However, direct replications that recreate the elements of
an original procedure down to the smallest detail are often
impossible to perform, especially if both independent and de-
pendent variables are mediated by social or cultural factors
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(Stroebe and Strack 2014, p. 61). Rather than a strict dichot-
omy between direct and conceptual replications, what we
have, then, is a range of cases, with studies closely resembling
the original experiment located near one end of the spectrum
and those using completely novel methods, near the other.
What distinguishes direct replications from conceptual ones
are the researcher’s intentions: if the researcher attempts to
produce a phenomenon according to an existing procedure
then her study is a direct replication, and if her aim is to
expand or refine current understanding of a phenomenon then
her study is a conceptual replication.
The need to conduct conceptual replications is not in ques-
tion. They are seen as valuable contributions to scientific
knowledge as they strike a balance between drawing on pre-
vious research and offering new insights. What is controver-
sial is the status of direct replications, which are criticized as
either impossible to perform, uninformative or potentially
(and often unfairly) damaging to the reputation of researchers
whose studies have failed to replicate (see Zwaan et al. 2018).
Zwaan et al. (2018) defend direct replications by pointing
to their role in theory testing. When researchers are unable to
reproduce findings that were initially taken to confirm a theo-
ry, its advocates are forced to explain this by proposing aux-
iliary hypotheses. If too many such hypotheses fail, the theory
may be rejected as part of a degenerative research program. If,
on the other hand, some auxiliary hypothesis garners empiri-
cal support, the theory is retained as progressive. Although
true, this claim presupposes rather than explains why it is that
researchers who are evaluating a theory make attempts at re-
producing previous findings. The main question, then, is why
and under what kind of conditions are direct replication
attempts justified.
Hüffmeier et al. (2016) provide an answer to this question
in the context of social psychology. They distinguish five
types of replication and assign a set of functions to each type.
Two of these types are subspecies of direct replication. Thus,
the central function of exact replications, i.e., direct replica-
tions performed by the same group of researchers, is to protect
the scientific community against false positives, which are
likely to occur when the first study is statistically underpow-
ered (exact replications are analogous to repeat measurements
in physics, chemistry and medicine). Exact replications are
strongly recommended when initial findings are either unex-
pected or loosely based on current theoretical models. Close
replications, i.e. direct replications performed by an indepen-
dent team of researchers, also reduce the likelihood of false
positives, especially those stemming from experimenter ef-
fects (Rosenthal 1966) and tacit knowledge. Moreover, they
provide information needed to establish the size of an effect,
which the original investigators are prone to overestimate.
But, above all, close replications enable the research commu-
nity not only to confirm the existence of an effect but also to
disconfirm it. Indeed, as Hüffmeier et al. (2016) note,
sometimes a series of independent close replications is the
only way to effectively undermine the reality of a prematurely
accepted phenomenon.
Interestingly, psychologists who are calling for more repli-
cations (Zwaan et al. 2018) seem to equate replication with
reproducing experimental procedures. They fail to recognize
an additional, non-empirical dimension of the replication cri-
sis because they take it for granted that science is primarily
concerned with empirical problems. This empiricist belief is
shared by most experimental neuroscientists, which poses a
challenge to the field of computational neuroscience (De
Schutter 2008), but is deeply problematic because it forces
us to view a great deal of scientific activity as irrational
(Laudan 1977). Many debates in science have focused on
theoretical and conceptual issues. The Copernican revolution
was not about empirical adequacy (Kuhn 1957, 1962), and
neither was Chomsky’s critique of Skinnerian theory of lan-
guage (Chomsky 1959). If we view science as an activity
directed at solving both empirical and theoretical problems
we immediately see that the confidence crisis does not only
affect empirical studies but also computational modeling. This
is all the more significant because a vast majority of theoret-
ical studies in neuroscience and cognitive science are based on
computational modeling (Busemeyer and Diederich 2010).
3 The confidence crisis in computational
modeling
The distinction between direct and conceptual replications has
a counterpart in computational modeling. Unfortunately, there
is no standard terminology to go with it (Plesser 2018).
Claerbout, who was the first to call for replicability in compu-
tational modeling, marked the distinction using the terms Bre-
production^ and Breplication^ (see Claerbout and Karrenbach
1992). He defined model reproduction as the procedure of
obtaining the same outputs by running the same software on
the same inputs (which corresponds with the psychologist’s
notion of direct replication) and model replication as
obtaining sufficiently similar results by designing and running
new code based on a published description of a model (which
corresponds with conceptual replication in psychology and
reproduction in physics, chemistry and medicine; Plesser
2018, Rougier et al. 2017). However, following an influential
paper by Drummond (2009), many, though not all, authors in
the field have switched the meanings of these terms. Thus, the
Association for Computing Machinery (Delling et al. 2016)
has recently recommended the following usage: repeatability
involves a researcher being able to reliably repeat her compu-
tations, replicability consists in a group of researchers being
able to obtain the same results using an original author’s arti-
facts, and reproducibility means that an independent group of
researchers can obtain the same results using artifacts which
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they develop completely independently. This is how we use
these terms whenever we discuss computational modeling.
Note, however, that this terminological convention applies
only to computational modeling—when discussing experi-
mental (empirical) studies we use Breplication^ as an umbrella
term, covering both repeatability (agreement between mea-
surements taken by the original researcher) and reproducibil-
ity (involving an independent researcher).
So is computational science facing a confidence crisis sim-
ilar to that occurring in experimental studies? A cursory
glance at the literature confirms that it is. A number of authors
in the computational science community are drawing attention
to problems with model replicability and reproducibility
(Hutson 2018; Peng 2011; Rougier et al. 2017; Sandve et al.
2013). Model reproduction is rarely performed (Legéndi et al.
2013) because successful reproductions do not seem to deliver
novel scientific results and causes of failed reproduction may
be difficult to discern. Instead of reproducing a model with
new data, researchers tend to compare new models with pre-
vious work.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no major journal
accepts publications related to computational replications or
reproductions. The journal ReScience (https://rescience.github.
io), which aims to fill this gap, was established in 2015 but has
as few as 22 papers as of August 2018. The complexity of
current computational modeling means that both replications
and reproductions are far from trivial. Not only are most
published computational studies unaccompanied by any code,
let alone the original data or custom scripts, but it is rarely
documented how exactly the model was produced. One may
reasonably suspect that at least some models, even those whose
verbal descriptions seem plausible, owe their success to
complex undiscovered bugs in the original software that is no
longer available. Thus, even faithful replication of these models
does not guarantee that the model actually represents the
intended phenomenon (cf. Stroebe and Strack 2014).
In a recent article, Manninen et al. (2017) reported their
investigation into the reproducibility of four existing compu-
tational models of principal types of astrocyte activity. Two of
the models deal with spontaneous Ca2+ excitability in single
astrocytes (Lavrentovich and Hemkin 2008; Riera et al. 2011),
while the other two simulate the neurotransmitter-evoked ex-
citability of this element (De Pittà et al. 2009; Dupont et al.
2011). Manninen et al. evaluated the possibility of reproduc-
ing the original findings with a reimplementation of the equa-
tions offered in the original papers. Furthermore, they inves-
tigated reusability of the models with other parameters and
setups. Their investigation showed a number of inaccuracies.
First of all, they found that it is impossible to reimplement
three of the models, those by Riera et al. (2011), De Pittà
et al. (2009) and Dupont et al. (2011), due to insufficient
information in published papers. Relying on the original paper
and a subsequent corrigendum, the researchers were able to
reproduce the outcomes of only one model of astrocyte activ-
ity, i.e., by Lavrentovich and Hemkin (2008). Manninen and
colleagues found serious mistakes in the mathematical formal-
isms presented in two original papers (Riera et al. 2011 and
Dupont et al. 2011), which made exact reproduction impossi-
ble. Only after modifying the equat ions did the
reimplementation of these models begin to work correctly.
Furthermore, when they set out to perform comparative as-
sessment, the researchers observed that, although the models
target the same phenomenon, their performance differs signif-
icantly. For instance, the model of spontaneous Ca2+ excitabil-
ity developed by Lavrentovich and Hemkin (2008) began to
give completely different results when Manninen and
colleagues applied parameter values from the Riera et al.
(2011) model of the same phenomenon. To sum up, prominent
computational models of astrocyte excitability—one of the
key biological events participating in synaptic transmis-
sion—are very hard to recreate and compare.
A number of recommendations have been made to ad-
dress the problem of irreplicability and irreproducibility in
computational modeling. It has been suggested, for exam-
ple, that all code should be shared (Buckheit and Donoho
1995; Sandve et al. 2013). However, according to a recent
survey by Gundersen (see Hutson 2018), this call is largely
ignored as only 6% of the 400 algorithms presented at two
top AI conferences in the past few years contained the code
and only a third had pseudocode, or simplified summaries
of the code. Furthermore, Stodden et al. (2018) have re-
cently investigated the effectiveness of a replicational pol-
icy adopted by Science in 2011. Since then, the journal
requires authors to make the data and code sufficient to
replicate their study available to other researchers upon
request. Stodden and colleagues selected 204 computation-
al studies published in Science. Out of those, 24 papers
(about 12%) provided code and data via external links or
supplementary material. Stodden and colleagues contacted
the authors of the remaining 180 studies. To start with,
26% of the authors failed to reply altogether while the
others often responded evasively—e.g., by asking for rea-
sons, making unfulfilled promises or directing the re-
searchers back to supplementary material. In the end, it
was possible to obtain artifacts for only 36% of the papers.
Overall, Stodden and colleagues estimated about 25% of
the models to be replicable. Their investigation has shown
that the requirement to share data on demand after publish-
ing is not being followed. Until recently the policy of
Nature journals was similar. Adopted in 2014, the policy
demanded that authors explicitly express readiness to share
the code and data (BDoes your code stand up to scrutiny?^
2018). The situation in computational neuroscience is not
much better. According to our survey, 32% of the 242
articles published in three prominent journals from
January 1, 2016, to September 26, 2018, contained code
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(available either in supplementary material or in an open
repository).1
But sharing code would not by itself solve the problem of
model irreplicability. As Crook et al. (2013) point out, it may
not be possible to recreate a published result even when the
code is available. Causes of this include differences in the
version of the computational platform (or its simulator), the
compiler, or of shared libraries that are used by either the
simulator or the code, or even poor record-keeping on the part
of the researcher who published the paper. Therefore, one may
be tempted to set the bar even higher. Sandve et al. (2013)
propose no fewer than ten rules to ensure model replicability.
These rules involve tracking how results were produced,
avoiding the manual manipulation of data sets, archiving the
exact versions of external programs used, using version con-
trol to store custom scripts, recording intermediate results
(preferably in standardized formats), noting random seeds
for randomized analyses, storing raw data behind plots,
connecting textual statements to underlying results and finally
providing public access to scripts, runs and results.
It is doubtful whether such guidelines will remedy the sit-
uation if not suitably motivated. Before adopting a methodo-
logical rule, researchers should understand its purpose and
know its possible side-effects. They also need to decide
whether the intended aim of adopting a rule is worth pursuing
relative to other aims. Otherwise they run the risk of acting at
cross purposes. For instance, The Journal of Neuroscience
announced in 2010 that it would no longer allow authors to
include supplemental material with new manuscripts or host
such material on its website (Maunsell 2010). Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the editorial board justified its decision by appeal to
the requirement that scientific results must be subject to public
scrutiny. The argument was simple. Although initially plausi-
ble, the idea of sharing computer code in supplemental mate-
rial had soon backfired when the reviewers started to require
authors to provide code and the authors reacted by providing
more and more of it—so much, in fact, that the reviewers were
unable to assess the code’s quality. Paradoxically, then, a mea-
sure designed to improve model replicability had come into
conflict with public controllability of scientific results.
4 Model replication vs. model reproduction
Clearly, before implementing specific measures to improve
replicability and reproducibility in computational modeling,
we need to get a better idea about what functions are served
by model replications on the one hand and model reproduc-
tions on the other. Needless to say, they must differ in some
respects from the functions of various types of reproduction
experiments in purely empirical studies. For one thing, it
makes no sense to say that a computational model is statisti-
cally underpowered, so one important reason for performing
exact replications of studies in social psychology becomes
irrelevant where computational modeling is concerned.
There are two important kinds of model evaluation: model
verification and model validation. To verify a model is to
make sure that it follows the specification. To validate it is to
ensure that it describes the target phenomenon at a required
level of detail (Zeigler 1976). As long as verification and
validation can be automated, repeating and replicating a mod-
el can both contribute to them. For example, if the specifica-
tion of a model is formalized, the model can also be verified
automatically by re-running specification-checking scripts. It
can also be validated if (1) the original data sets are also
publicly available (for example, by performing randomized
cross-validation) or (2) new data sets can be fed into the model
to process. However, repeating the model, or running it again
by the original researcher(s) on the original data, need not
contribute to model verification or validation. Sometimes it
only shows that the model actually operates. By contrast, as
Rand and Wilensky (2006) observe, a successful replication
demonstrates that the implementation of a model follows the
official specification, which constitutes model verification.
Replications may also be useful in detecting type I errors in
scientific papers, such as typographical mistakes in numerical
values in figures or tables. Whenever there is a discrepancy
between the paper contents and the code, running the code
may help to discover the mistakes. By following the rules
proposed by Sandve et al. (2013), we safeguard model repeat-
ability and replicability. However, compared to empirical
studies, whose direct replications enable researchers to either
confirm the original effect or else weed out false positives, the
fact that model replications are rarely performed does not pose
a serious threat to scientific progress.
Only by reproducing a model, or offering what psychol-
ogists would call a conceptual replication, can we discover
the model’s hidden assumptions, bugs or unexpected inter-
actions. Moreover, a successful reproduction contributes to
model validation. Validation is methodologically more
valuable than verification because it shows how an imple-
mented model corresponds to empirical data. In particular,
by validating a computational model through reproduction
we make sure that the results of modeling are sound (see
Drummond 2009 for a similar argument).
1 Note that the ratio varies according to journal. We have investigated the
Journal of Computational Neuroscience (108 articles) and two other core
journals listed at the official website of the Organization of Computational
Neurosciences: namely, Frontiers in Neuroinformatics (79 pieces) and
Biological Cybernetics (55 pieces). The results for the Journal of
Computational Neuroscience and Frontiers in Neuroinformatics are compara-
ble, with 40 out of the 108 papers (37%) published in the Journal of
Computational Neuroscience and 32 out of the 79 articles (40%) published
in Frontiers in Neuroinformatics providing code. By contrast, only 5 out of the
55 studies (9%) published in Biological Cybernetics included such references.
Note also that our investigation was limited to original research articles in the
field of computational neuroscience (we excluded papers presenting results
from other fields as well as methodological or software description papers).
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The upshot is that, unlike model replicability, model repro-
ducibility is essential to long-term scientific progress. Without
it, research in computational modeling can degenerate into
something akin to alchemy, with every practitioner essentially
working alone. Lack of replicability is a minor obstacle by
comparison. Improving reproducibility should be the first or-
der of business.
Why is so much research in computational modeling irre-
producible? Researchers typically attempt to reproduce a re-
sult in order to compare their new model to a previous state-
of-the-art model, usually with new empirical data. Model re-
productions fail not only due to type II errors but also due to
type I errors: errors of omission of information that is crucial
to recreating the model based on its published description or to
using the model on new (kinds of) data.
The normative principle that is violated when a computa-
tional model is irreproducible asserts that the ideal text de-
scribing the model should be complete, i.e., contain all and
only relevant information. This principle has been extensively
discussed in the recent philosophy of science, in the context of
the new mechanistic approach to explanation. According to
this approach, to explain a phenomenon in terms of how it is
constituted is to elucidate its underlying causal structure and
organized components and operations of the mechanism re-
sponsible for the phenomenon (Craver 2007; Machamer et al.
2000). The defenders of the new mechanistic approach have
been criticized for assuming that ideal explanatory texts
should include too much detail (Chirimuuta 2014).
However, what they claim is not that one should include all
kinds of detail. Only relevant detail counts (Baetu 2015;
Craver and Kaplan 2018; Miłkowski 2016).
In the new mechanistic approach, the focus is on causal
explanatory models, i.e., models of mechanisms that are re-
sponsible for some phenomena. Thus, complete explanatory
texts Brepresent all and only the relevant portions of the causal
structure of the world^ (Craver 2007, p. 27). The kind of
relevance in question is explanatory relevance vis-à-vis a cer-
tain phenomenon to be explained. The completeness of the
mechanistic model is to be understood as specifying the whole
causal model; to specify the causal model, one needs to know
all and only the relevant variables and their connections in the
graph that describes it.
How could this be useful for evaluating papers on compu-
tational models in neuroscience? The principle of complete-
ness may strike one as too general to yield any practical con-
sequences but this is not true. It implies, for example, that
including irrelevant detail in an explanatory text is detrimental
to the quality of an explanation as it makes understanding
difficult. Unfortunately, researchers do not always avoid the
pitfall of writing too much. For example, Parr and Friston
(2018) devote two sections of their paper on oculomotion to
basic equations of the free energy framework instead of spec-
ifying exactly how their computer simulation was built, which
is described extremely tersely, without any quantitative detail.
This makes little sense as far as model reproducibility is con-
cerned, given that they cite other papers that offer a fuller
introduction to their framework. Scientific papers are not au-
tonomous entities that are read in complete isolation; instead,
they are parts of an explanation distributed over a collection of
papers (Hochstein 2015). Thus, the basics of an approach
should be relegated to introductory papers. From the perspec-
tive of reproducibility, the paper by Parr and Friston (2018)
contains both too much (lengthy introductions, complex fig-
ures instead of data) and too little information (no experimen-
tal data fed into the simulation, no details of the simulation
framework).
Similarly, not all kinds of data in the supplemental material
would be required; the ideal would be to have all and only
code and data that are causally relevant to oculomotion. A
crucial part of modeling, therefore, is to explicitly theorize
about the phenomena in question: one has to understand ex-
actly what is meant by oculomotion to fully evaluate whether
the computational model is complete. Completeness is
assessed relative to the phenomenon to be explained. This
means that there are no fast-and-easy solutions to the problem
of model irreproducibility, since there are no specific guide-
lines covering all potential target phenomena. However, if we
look at the question of relevance on a case-by-case basis, we
see that it is not intractable.
Let us return to the study of models of astrocyte activity.
Manninen et al. (2017) notice that graphical illustrations of
models are often misleading or completelymissing, and some-
times not all equations are explicitly given in the publications
about models but referred to with a citation to a previous
model publication. These may be type I errors unless all these
equations are found in the previous publication. However,
there are also type II errors. As the authors say, Bit is often
difficult to know exactly what the actual model components
are^ (ibid., p. 15). And even if these components are known, it
is sometimes unclear what they are supposed to correspond to
in the biological domain. Furthermore, Manninen et al. explic-
itly point out that the analyzed models are biologically incom-
plete: Bthe four studied models consider only a subset of
mechanisms responsible for astrocyte Ca2+ excitability and
leave out several essential mechanisms, such as the cell mem-
brane ionic currents and various intracellular signaling
cascades.^ (p. 15).
Of course, not all omissions and simplifications violate the
completeness principle, for no neuroscientific work can or
should avoid idealizations (Miłkowski 2016). It should be
obvious that these are idealizations introduced to make the
paper or the model more perspicuous. The model cannot re-
flect the full complexity of a physical mechanism on pain of
becoming explanatorily obscure. However, a model of an ide-
alized phenomenon does not violate the mechanistic norm of
completeness as long as it includes all and only causal
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interactions relevant to the phenomenon, defined in an ideal-
izing fashion. Hence, for example, one might idealize away
the influence of memory tasks (which may rely on eye
movements; cf. Johansson and Johansson 2014) in theorizing
about the mechanism of oculomotion. Note that memory tasks
may themselves cause certain kinds of eye movements but
oculomotion is understood mostly to be related to five basic
kinds of eye movement (Dodge 1903).
Causal explanatory models are but one of many kinds of
models used in computational neuroscience. For example,
computational models can be used for predictive purposes,
and some models are used for purely exploratory reasons, to
understand complex interactions between certain variables in
a class of models. There might also be models of purposively
simplified artificial animals in neuroethology (Arbib 2003;
Braitenberg 1984). In all such cases, however, there is a cer-
tain, usually formally definable, relationship between the
model and its target, which underlies the validity of a model.
This relationship specifies the relevance in question: the paper
describing the model should contain all and only information
considered to be relevant in assessing the relationship in
question.
As far as model reproducibility is concerned, specific rules
such as those introduced by Sandve et al. (2013) are of little
help unless they contribute to an understanding of how theo-
retical principles are translated into modeling practice. Indeed,
they can improve replicability at the cost of affecting repro-
ducibility. Specifying the exact computational platform
should not be required as long as software is designed to be
portable for interoperability. With the exception of the use of
supercomputers, specialized hardware or very sensitive real-
time requirements, if the details of the computational architec-
ture count then the model may be too sensitive to improper
background conditions, and its scientific value is limited. It is
simply poor-quality code. Thus, while avoiding prototype
code and quick hacks is difficult in actual scientific work, this
kind of code should be discardable. It should be possible to
reconstruct the model with no knowledge of such detail, from
a paper only.
What we suggest, then, is that a paper should above all
contain all and only information needed to reproduce a model
and assess the model’s intended relationship to its target. By
contrast, information necessary to replicate a model, including
code and experimental data sets, should be deposited in open
repositories (Migliore et al. 2003). Research papers and repos-
itories serve different functions, though ultimately both should
contribute to the same overarching goal of making science
cumulative. If science communication continues to rely on
journal papers then too much irrelevant detail will make read-
ing (and reviewing) them impossible. Open model reposito-
ries facilitate replication and code reuse.
A similar division of function has been defended by
Nordlie et al. (2009), who also stress that publication serves
a different function from code. Their proposal also helps to
deal with highly complexmodels, such as detailed simulations
of neocortical microcircuitry (Markram et al. 2015) or func-
tional simulations of the whole brain (Eliasmith et al. 2012).
The authors suggest that papers that describe such models
should be, if needed, split: one paper should contain the model
description, and another its analysis. In the worst case, the
description could be relegated to supplementary materials,
but they notice—as we did—that these may not be properly
peer-reviewed, and authors may not receive proper credit be-
cause these are not citable. At the same time, Nordlie et al.
(2009) offer detailed guidelines, based on the analysis of 14
papers on neuronal networks, aimed at making future papers
complete. Thus, while their contribution is more detailed and
specifically tailored to neuronal network models, it is quite
close to ours in spirit.
Let us close by comparing and contrasting our proposal
with the best practices defended by Manninen et al. (2011):
We propose that all models should (1) be formulated
using common description language, (2) have adequate
metadata related to model and experimental data used,
(3) explain set of features describing the overall behav-
ior of the modeled system, and (4) be compared to pre-
vious models. In other words, all new models should be
constructed according to clearly defined general rules
(p. 9).
We wholeheartedly agree with (3), which we try to clarify
in terms of the principle of completeness. As to (4), it is a
necessary step in defending the quality of a model, and such
defenses are always contrastive. We believe that it is essential-
ly correct, though not directly associated with replicability or
reproducibility. What about a common description language
and metadata?
Standardizing scientific work makes interoperability
easier, which is obviously required for model replication.
But standardizing prematurely will inevitably lead to a
proliferation of standards instead of increasing interopera-
bility. The problem is that we still do not know what should
be included in the ideal future computational description of
a model. Thus, any cutting-edge work is in danger of not
being expressible in a common description language,
which will require small adjustments of such languages,
whose variety and number—but not necessarily their inter-
operability—will increase over time. There are already
several such languages, such as SBML, CellML,
FieldML, NineML, LEMS/NeuroML and PyNN (Davison
et al. 2008; Gleeson et al. 2010; Cannon et al. 2014;
McDougal et al. 2016). It should not be considered a seri-
ous violation of scientific norms to publish a paper describ-
ing new work without conforming to a previous standard.
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The same goes for open source software, which, as some
argue, should be used whenever possible to generate publish-
able results (Easterbrook 2014; Gleeson et al. 2017).
However, open source software is required only for replicabil-
ity, and is not necessary for reproducibility. In other words,
adherence to a common description language, common meta-
data description format and using open source software are all
desirable but not strictly necessary features of correct scientif-
ic reporting.
5 Concluding remarks
In this opinion paper, we have argued that model reproduc-
ibility and replicability are different goals. In a nutshell, effec-
tive scientific communication requires that all and only rele-
vant information is shared, and this is the basic guideline for
model reproducibility. Model replicability and repeatability
require that all details relevant to running the code be shared
even if they are scientifically inessential. We hope that under-
standing that model repeatability, replicability, and reproduc-
ibility require different solutions will, in the long run, alleviate
the current problems in the computational modeling
community.
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